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Abstract The literature concerning ethical issues asso-
ciated with nanotechnologies has become prolific. How-
ever,ithasbeenclaimedthatethicalproblemsareonlyat
stake with rather sophisticated nanotechnologies such as
active nanostructures, integrated nanosystems and het-
erogeneous molecular nanosystems, whereas more basic
nanotechnologies such as passive nanostructures mainly
pose technical difficulties. In this paper I argue that
fundamental ethical issues are already at stake with this
more basic kind of nanotechnologies and that ethics
impacts every kind of nanotechnologies, already from
the simplest kind of engineered nanoproducts. These
ethical issues are mainly associated with the social desir-
abilityofnanotechnologies,withthedifficultiestodefine
nanotechnologies properly, with theimportant uncertain-
ties surrounding nanotechnologies, with the threat of
‘nano-divide’, and with nanotechnology as ‘dual-use
technology’.
Keywords Ethics.Equity.Dual-usetechnology.
Generationsofnanotechnologies.Informedconsent.
Nano-divide.Nanotechnologies.Precautionary
principle.Risk.Socialdesirability.Uncertainty
Introduction
The literature regarding ethical issues associated with
nanotechnologies has become prolific. Many topics
are at stake: the governance of nanotechnologies, the
existence of nanoethics as a field on its own, health
and environmental issues, ethical responsibilities of
nanotechnology researchers, the blurring between cat-
egories such as nature and artefact, etc. However, the
International Risk Governance Council has argued in
its White paper on nanotechnology risk governance
that fundamental ethical problems arise only with
rather sophisticated nanotechnologies, whereas more
basic nanotechnologies mainly pose technical difficul-
ties [10]. It appears though that fundamental ethical
issues are already at stake with basic nanotechnolo-
gies. The objective of this paper is to highlight these
ethical problems and thereby to show that ethics
impacts all types of nanotechnologies.
The paper is structured as follows. First I will intro-
duce Roco’s typology of generation of nanotech nolo-
gies (“Generations of Nanotechnologies”). Then, I will
present a conception, which assumes that ethics plays a
role mainly from the second generation of nanotechnol-
ogies(“ACommonConception:EthicsfromtheSecond
Generation of Nanotechnologies”). In a third part, I will
review the main ethical issues arising from this second
generation of nanotechnologies (“Specific Ethical
Issues Associated with the 2nd, the 3rd and the 4th
Generations of Nanotechnologies”). Next, I will show
that, beyond these specific issues, there are fundamental
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Finally, I will proceed to the conclusion (“Conclusion”).
Generations of Nanotechnologies
The term “nanotechnologies” designates both relative-
ly simple nanomaterials such as stain-resistant cotton
fabrics or tennis balls, and very complex—and hypo-
thetic—technologies that are supposed to redefine the
future of mankind, such as brain implants that would
enhance human capacities. In fact, it includes an ex-
tremely wide range of potential applications—food,
chemicals, personal care products, medical devices,
water quality, and so on ([11], p. 8). It seems thus
unrealistic to think of ‘nanotechnologies’ as a single
technology and to consider all the different types of
applications at once. In this perspective, distinctions
have been made in order to characterize the different
types of applications at stake, the main differentiation
criteria being whether they are currently available or
envisioned for the future ([15], p. 98): some authors
speak of ‘near term’ and ‘advanced’ nanotechnology,
some of ‘incremental’, ‘evolutionary’ or ‘radical’
nanotechnology, while others introduce the idea of
‘generations of nanotechnologies’.
Mihail Roco has proposed this latter framework,
with four overlapping generations of nanotechnologies
(Fig. 1), which are progressively introduced over time
[25]. In a more recent paper, he has also added con-
verging technologies on the timeline, which are sup-
posed to appear after generation 4 [26].
– First-generation nanotechnologies correspond to
passive nanostructures—passive because the be-
haviour of the material is supposed to be steady
over time. Most frequently, it consists in adding a
nanomaterial to another material in order to im-
prove its performances. It is the case of materials
with specific properties such as cosmetics or
coatings—for example antibacterial materials
based on nanosilver. Most of the current applica-
tions of nanotechnologies belong to this first
generation.
– Second-generation nanotechnologies are active
nanostructures, which change their behaviour
according to their environment. These active
structures are thus able to perform functions, such
as targeting drugs to specific parts of the body.
Targeted cancer therapies illustrate concretely this
second generation of nanotechnologies.
– Third-generation nanotechnologies correspond to
integrated nanosystems, in other words ‘systems
of nanosystems’, such as artificial organs built
from the nanoscale. According to Roco, these
are supposed to be developed from now on.
– Fourth-generation nanotechnologies are antici-
pated to be heterogeneous molecular nanosys-
tems, ‘where each molecule in the nanosystem
has a specific structure and plays a different role’
[25]. It would include macromolecules ‘by de-
sign’, nanoscale machines and interfaces between
humans and machines at the tissue and nervous
system levels ([7], p. 11). They are supposed to
emerge from 2015/2020.
– Converging technologies will be technologies
resulting from the convergence of NBICs technol-
ogies (Nanotechnologies, Biotechnologies, Infor-
mation technologies and Cognitive science) such
as nano-bio-info from nanoscale, cognitive tech-
nologies or large complex systems from nanoscale
([26], p. 433).
It is worth noting that the distinction between gen-
erations 2, 3 and 4 is rather unclear: as Davies notes,
‘even knowledgeable experts have expressed difficul-
ty distinguishing among Roco’s last three generations’
([7], p. 11).
Does Roco’s speculative project leave a space for
ethics? If the answer is yes, when should ethics
play a role?
Passive nanostructures
Active nanostructures
Integrated nanosystems
Molecular nanosystems
~2000
~2005
~2010
~2015-2020
Converging technologies
>2020
Fig. 1 Generations of nanotechnologies—inspired from ([26],
p. 433)
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Several authors emphasize the role of ethics only from
the second generation of nanotechnologies.
For example, during the ‘J3N (national network in
nanosciences and nanotechnologies, France) days’ in
2006, Françoise Roure presented passive nanostruc-
tures as being the source of ‘traditional’ toxicological
or ecotoxicological risks without posing further ethical
problems, which were recognized to be relevant from
the stage of active nanostructures [27].
It is also the position of the International Risk Gover-
nance Council, in the IRGC white paper on nanotech-
nology governance [10]. This is a founding paper,
written by Ortwin Renn and Mihail Roco, which propo-
ses a conceptual risk governance framework at the inter-
national level. A more thorough analysis appears thus to
be relevant. Their framework refers to two frames of
reference for the categorisation of nanotechnology eval-
uation. These frames are based on the evolution of
knowledge, the level of complexity and the potential
social and ethical consequences: frame 1 considers pas-
sive nanostructures, whereas frame 2 considers active
nanostructures, integrated nanosystems and heteroge-
neous molecular nanosystems ([10], p. 33).
More precisely, frame 1 corresponds to the context
of classical technology assessment, looking into the
physical impacts of the application of first generation
nanotechnologies ([10], p. 37–41). In this frame, the
risk appraisal stage focuses on classical risk assess-
ment, where the usual toxicological and epidemiolog-
ical methods can be applied.
On the other hand, frame 2 ‘addresses the context
of social desirability of innovations looking into pro-
cesses of technical modernisation, changes in the in-
terface between humans and machines/products and
ethical issues concerned with the boundaries of inter-
vention into the environment and the human body’
([10], p. 37–38). Beyond the focus on classical risk
assessment, the risk appraisal stage focuses here on
‘concern assessment’, which corresponds to an assess-
ment of risk perception and the societal context of risk.
Scientific methods of concern analysis, empirical atti-
tude, value research and ethical reasoning are thus
more appropriate to frame 2 ([10], p. 41).
In the same vein, at the risk communication level,
the White paper suggests to distinguish between the
risk communication programmes for each of the two
frames: ‘the first communication strategy (for both
frames 1 and 2) should be designed to enlighten the
discussion about the benefits and non-intended side
effects and the means to identify and quantify those
effects. (…) The second strategy (particularly for
frame 2) should be directed towards a broader debate
on the desirability of special applications of nanotech-
nology in the light of ethical and social issues (…)’
([10], p. 61).
Even though ethics is implicitly embedded in
frame 1,
1 it is clear that, for the authors, the core of
ethics lies is frame 2: ‘the ethical implications of
nanotechnology development on risk governance
are particularly important for frame 2’ ([10], p. 39–
40). However, we will see that fundamental ethical
issues are already at stake with the development of
passive nanostructures. Before that, let us review the
main ethical questions associated with active nano-
structures, integrated nanosystems and heterogeneous
molecular nanosystems.
Specific Ethical Issues Associated with the 2nd,
the 3rd andthe 4th Generations ofNanotechnologies
This section summarizes the recurrent ethical issues
linked to the 2nd, the 3rd and the 4th generations of
nanotechnologies, which can be found in the literature.
Many ethical issues are associated with the advance-
ments in nanomedicine (second and third generations of
nanotechnologies), insofar as they might possibly
threatentheprinciplesofequity,ofautonomy,ofprivacy
and data protection, and of safety and responsibility.
Indeed, the development of medical applications of
nanotechnology will inevitably exacerbate the question
of access to treatments and thus equity and distributive
justice issues. These will arise within developed
countries, for example with the improvements of tar-
geted cancer therapies that only the richest patients will
be able to afford, but also between developed and
developing countries ([1], p. 191), with new medi-
cines that will help to prevent HIV infection specially
1 For example, when the authors ask the question of how much
precaution is necessary when producing the nanomaterials and
their potential applications ([10], p. 14), or when they acknowl-
edge that ‘political and security risks’ and ‘educational gap risk’
are raised with the development of first generation nanotechnol-
ogies ([10], p. 15).
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afford these. The principle of autonomy is also at stake
as, in some cases, nanotherapies might possibly be used
without the informed consent of the patient. Moreover,
medical surveillance will lead to privacy and data pro-
tection issues. Lab-on-chip technologies designed to
facilitate medical diagnosis and screening, and the
decoding of genetic dispositions could become com-
monly used. The question of who will have access to
the resulting medical records—employers? insurance
companies?—will then of course arise ([1], p. 192).
Finally, safety and responsibility issues will arise from
the emergence of implantable drug delivery nanochips,
of nanoparticles that can release on demand pharma-
ceuticals, or of nanochips, which will be able to provide
earlydiagnosis.Thecontrolandthereversibilityofthese
technologies, which are supposed to be able to evolve
within their environment, are at stake, especially be-
cause it is currently not well understood how these
might interact with the body. In this context, what can
go wrong and who is supposed to be responsible if
something goes wrong are two questions that need to
be answered.
The right to privacy and the protection of personal
data could be threatened in general, beyond the ques-
tion of the protection of medical information. Indeed,
with the emergence of nanochips, the problems al-
ready at stake with other information technologies
are exacerbated. As van den Hoven and Vermaas put
it, ‘RFID foreshadows what nano-electronics has in
store for our privacy: invisible surveillance’ ([36], p.
292). With nanotechnologies, information systems
will have a greater ability to retrieve data about some-
one without the person knowing it ([35], p. 217). More
speculatively, nanosensors could be implanted in the
human body without informing the individual about it.
Thereby, they could literally lead to spy on individu-
als. Beyond the threat to the right to privacy and to
individual freedom, some fear for human dignity as
these nanochips could lead to the manipulation of the
individual’s will and behaviour [6].
Issues associated with human enhancement [18, 19]
are also susceptible to arise with and after the devel-
opment of the third and fourth generations. Human
enhancement is indeed the explicit agenda of the Na-
tional Science Foundation program Converging Tech-
nologies for Improving Human Performance [21],
which considers the convergence of NBICs. In this
perspective, converging technologies could be used to
modify the physical, cognitive or emotional capacities
of human beings. The question of the legitimacy of
human enhancement is at stake, as such technological
developments would have a price: not only will they
inevitably lead to equity problems [4, 8], human dig-
nity issues, but they will also challenge elements of
our symbolic order [34] and involve threats to funda-
mental representations such as human nature [5, 13],
threats which are inherent to ideologies such as
transhumanism.
Moreover, metaphysical questions are susceptible
to arise with the hybridization of living and lifeless.
Indeed, the distinction between the categories of na-
ture and artefact are blurred as soon as we consider the
elementary building blocks of the living or of nature as
machines or devices.
2 In the same vein, the boundary
between human and non-human will also become
indistinct with the modification of human beings at
the nano level. The blurring of these categories implies
also ethical consequences, as they lead to the ques-
tions surrounding the patentability of nanoproducts
involving life forms—or even human beings.
More generally for generations 2, 3 and 4, the
question of public involvement is acknowledged to
be at stake. There is, for the first time, a demand
coming from governmental agencies for public
debates about nanotechnologies before the start of a
massive public opposition to these. However, and
regrettably, such efforts are possibly made in order to
pre-empt oppositions such as in the case of nuclear
power or GM foods, and to secure public support for
these developments. The proposals of Roco and Renn
can be interpreted in such a way, when they say ‘if
(…) risk perception is not based on the best available
knowledge, innovative opportunities may be lost’
([10], p. 15). As Bensaude-Vincent puts it, it is funda-
mental, for nanotechnologies promoters, to provide
the conception and the production of new artefacts
with a ‘social engineering’, which would prepare the
society upstream to accept these innovations [6]. This
leads to the fact that, implicitly, we are still facing a
‘top-down’ approach, where the promoters are impos-
ing innovations to citizens, considered as passive
2 ‘Science publique’, radiobroadcast from France Culture by
Michel Alberganti (26th of June 2009), interview of
Bensaude-Vincent, B. Faut-il craindre la technoscience? Re-
trieved on April 15, 2011, from http://www.fabriquedesens.net/
Faut-il-craindre-la-technoscience
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raises of course many ethical questions, as does the
instrumentalization of the social debate.
Ethics in Generation 1
Besides these ethical issues that arise from generation
2, crucial ethical questions appear already with the
development of passive nanotechnologies even though
the IRGC White paper does not give them any priority.
These are intertwined with social, legal, economic and
environmental issues.
This section highlights these main issues confront-
ing first generation nanotechnologies. It takes as a
starting point specific problems posed by nanotech-
nologies: the question of the social desirability of first
generation nanotechnologies, the ethical issues associ-
ated with the difficulties to define nanotechnologies
properly, the ones linked to uncertainties surrounding
nanotechnologies, the threat of ‘nano-divide’, and the
ethical issues linked to nanotechnology as ‘dual-use
technology’.
Questioning the Social Desirability of First Generation
Nanotechnologies
As a reminder, in the IRGC white paper on nanotech-
nology risk governance, Roco and Renn insisted on
the necessity, for generations 2, 3 and 4, to question
the desirability of special applications of nanotech-
nology in the light of ethical and social issues
([10], p. 61). If it is acknowledged that such an
upstream approach is needed from generation 2,
these fundamental questions were avoided in the
case of generation 1. However, the question of the
social desirability is also legitimate in this case—
all the issues mentioned in “Ethics in generation 1”
are contributing to the justification of such a debate.
Avoiding the debate on the desirability of first gener-
ation nanotechnologies has implicitly led to impose
these technological developments, which are not nec-
essarily corresponding to social needs or public aspi-
rations ([12], p. 29).
As some of these nanoproducts are already on the
market, the focus is on their potential risks. In this
context, the utilitarian framework of risk/cost/benefit
analysis, based on the evaluation of consequences at
the economic level as well as at the levels of health
and safety, is the most common framework invoked
for the evaluation of nanotechnologies, even though
framing the debate in terms of risks and benefits
appears rather reductionist. Indeed, it allows to consider
theprinciplesofbeneficenceandnon-maleficence,butit
neglects many other ethical principles such as the prin-
ciples of autonomy, justice and integrity ([16], p. 150),
which should also be taken into account. A pure con-
sequentialiststanceappearstobeinsufficientandshould
be balanced by deontological arguments, based on indi-
viduals’ fundamental rights and duties. This is however
a more general debate, which falls beyond the scope of
this paper.
Furthermore, the fact that the question of the desir-
ability of first generation nanotechnologies has been
avoided is all the more embarrassing considering the
fact that no particular labelling is currently required
for nanotechnologies. Hence, even at the individual
level, the citizen is not able to make a choice when
consuming nanoproducts—consumption, which hap-
pens without him knowing it.
Finally, the public interest issue of social desirabil-
ity of nanotechnologies is closely related to the ques-
tion of research funding, which is of course already at
stake with the development of generation 1. Indeed,
the funding of research in the field of nanotechnology
leads to ask who is supposed to decide upon the
orientation of public research. This issue is of para-
mount importance in the case of nanotechnologies,
considering the significance of the funding at stake.
If it leads to cut the budget allocated to other projects
that are ethically and socially desirable—such as the
ones related to health care, education or sustainable
development—then this choice should be justified
([1], p. 190). More generally, it is the question of the
link between the orientation of public research and the
citizens’ demands, which is at stake [14].
Ethical Issues Associated with the Difficulties
to Define Nanotechnologies Properly
The crucial question of the definition of nanotechnol-
ogies is also at stake, insofar as it is at the origin of
several ethical problems.
The question that arises is how to define nanos as
substances, which are different from their non-nano-
equivalent? Intuitively, the size comes to mind first
when we have to distinguish nano from non-nano. Usu-
ally, we speak of nanotechnologies when at least one
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ever, this 100 nm limit may seem somewhat arbitrary
([15], p. 98). Indeed, it is not obvious that 100 nm is the
typical size when the properties of the materials start
changing: for some properties, there is a gradual trans-
formation and for others, there are thresholds below
which the properties change suddenly ([3] p. 3). Hence
it is not sure that 100 nm has a significant biological
relevance([31],p.91).Besides,relyingonthisyardstick
doesnot allow totakeintoaccount neither particles with
specific properties—different from the bulk material—
but with a size slightly above 100 nm, nor aggregates of
nanoparticles, which would also exceed 100 nm. An-
other problem comes fromthe factthatrelying solelyon
the particles size is insufficient: other specific physical
features—such as shape—also influence drastically
their properties. In the same vein, the environment of
the particles and the fact that they may be associated
with other components play also an important role in
defining their characteristics.
Yet, in order to develop a regulatory framework
specific to nanotechnologies, we need to give an ex-
istence at the statutory and at the legal levels to these
objects [17]. Therefore, we need to be able to define
their identity, which appears to be currently very prob-
lematic. Let us illustrate the kind of ethical and regu-
latory problems proceeding from these definition
difficulties.
The labelling issue is arising in a specific way in the
case of nanotechnologies. Indeed, taking into account
only the chemical substance is insufficient: the size of
the particles plays also a role in defining toxic prop-
erties, as well as other characteristics such as shape. It
is therefore difficult to label nanoproducts ([17], p.
102). This is rather problematic as ‘the key ethical
concept related to risk and risk imposition is the notion
of consent’, with the classic conditions required to
ensure free and informed consent being disclosure,
understanding, voluntariness and competence ([32],
p. 49). Yet in the case of nanotechnologies, the lack
of proper disclosure of their risks and uncertainties
impedes the possibility, for the citizen, to make a free
and informed choice.
In the same perspective, we may wonder how to
demand the application of the precautionary principle,
ofteninvokedinthenameofthesafetyandsustainability
principles, when we are unable to define the products at
stake. This is particularly embarrassing considering that
the huge uncertainties surrounding nanotechnologies
mightpreciselyrequiretheapplicationoftheprecaution-
ary principle—this point is developed in the next
section.
Ethical Issues Associated with Uncertainties
Surrounding Nanotechnologies
We know that nanomaterials are characterized by
chemical, physical, electromagnetic and biological
properties that differ from the bulk structure composed
of the same chemical elements – and it is precisely the
uniqueness of these properties that makes nanotech-
nologies so attractive. Hence, their toxicity is also very
different from bulk particles. It is particularly the case
when the toxicity itself is the property that is useful,
such as in the case of nanosilver, which is bactericide.
However, currently, the knowledge about the process-
es involved is very limited and the uncertainties are of
paramount importance.
Under these conditions, is it ethically justifiable to
develop and to market such products? How can we
make sure that the principles of safety and sustainabil-
ity are not jeopardized? This leads of course directly to
the question of the precautionary principle. In order to
show more concretely why it is the case, let us review
some of the main uncertainties associated with
nanotechnologies.
With engineered passive nanoparticles, we are fac-
ing safety, environmental and health issues. If these
risks seem to be pretty close to classical chemical risks
in their nature—as these technologies are supposed to
behave steadily over time—their understanding is lim-
ited and they raise many epistemic issues.
At the safety level, we know, for example, that the
higher surface reactivity and surface-area-to-volume
ratio of nanoparticles increase the risk of dust explo-
sions and the ease of ignition ([10], p. 43). However,
the processes involved are not well understood yet.
At the environmental level, there is also a great deal
of uncertainty. The impact of nanoparticles may be
significant because of the potential for ([10], p. 44):
– bioaccumulation: due to their high mobility, nano-
particles can easily move in the air, water and soil,
contaminate the fauna and flora and thus be trans-
ferred to the food chain;
– persistence: creating non-biodegradable pollu-
tants, which will be hard to detect, might lead to
an important waste problem—even though
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intrinsically ecological.
Concerning health risks, it seems, at first sight, that
classical risk assessment procedures can be conducted.
It is the viewpoint of the International Risk Gover-
nance Council, amongst others [11]. However, the
situation is not so simple, as many uncertainties sur-
rounding nanotechnologies imply both theoretical and
practical problems, which makes it difficult to apply
these classical risk assessment procedures.
One first practical problem comes from the fact that
current measurement techniques are not sensitive
enough to measure the concentration of nanoscale
substances ([31], p. 40–41). Measurements are thus
not widely available and advancements in nanometrol-
ogy are clearly needed.
There is also a great deal of uncertainty about how
nanomaterials can penetrate the body (through inhala-
tion, ingestion, contact) and about their accumulation
([23], p. 255).
Another challenging problem specific to nanotech-
nologies comes from the fact that it is not obvious how
exposure relates to toxicity: it is unclear how the
chemical composition, the size, the shape, the surface
area, the surface chemistry, the crystal structure and
many other characteristics affect the toxicity of nano-
materials ([22]; [31], p. 42). Whereas, traditionally, the
chemical composition is sufficient to determine the
toxicity of a substance, the problem is much more
complex in the case of nanotechnologies from an
epistemic standpoint. In fact, there seems to be a shift
of paradigm in the field of toxicology as long as, with
nanotechnologies, it is impossible to determine once
for all ‘the right criteria’ to take into account in order to
assess nanotechnologies risks ([17], p. 79). This under-
mines a recommendation that is often made, which
consists in requiring a standardized procedure. Here, it
seems that a case-by-case approach would be needed,
even if it would be practically very difficult to conduct
considering the pace and the important number of new
nanoproducts that are put on the market. More gener-
ally, in fact, there cannot be a generic approach to
health, environment and safety regulation insofar as,
with the development of science and technologies at
the nanoscale, there will always be new kinds of effects
and new kinds of potential problems ([33], p. 17).
If we are willing to determine the social accept-
ability of nanotechnologies through a risk/cost/benefit
analysis, other difficulties arise. Indeed, this classical
utilitarian approach appears to be very problematic
insofar as the risks are not only largely unknown, but
also the benefits are difficult to assess ([23], p. 254;
[20], p. 45).
We can thus see why all these uncertainties make
nanotechnologies an ideal candidate for requiring the
precautionary principle, although, as mentioned be-
fore, the difficulties to define nanotechnologies prop-
erly hinder the application of this principle.
Such a precautionary approach—that Europe is in
principle willing to adopt—comes up against the ‘ac-
complished fact’ policy, as several types of nanopar-
ticles are already on the market [6], even though
several agencies and societies such as the Afssa
(Agence française de sécurité sanitaire des aliments),
the Afsset (Agence française de sécurité sanitaire de
l’environnement et du travail) or the Royal Society
([28], p. 85) have been trying to blow the whistle
about these risks and uncertainties.
On the other hand, a strong version of the precau-
tionary principle in the form of a moratorium or pure
abstention is not approved unanimously, which is not
surprising given the business interests that are at stake
and given the potential benefits of the development of
nanotechnologies. However, a precautionary approach
does not necessarily imply the kind of decision that
would be implemented through new or stricter laws
[18]. Indeed, another way to introduce precaution in
the development of nanotechnologies would be to
improve our evaluation of these materials through
the development of new testing methods and the elab-
oration of new standards, which can be integrated into
existing laws ([18], p 12). This is precisely Lin’s point,
who shows a way to take proportionate action in this
context. Stimulating research seems indeed to be an
appropriate way of action, insofar as it would probably
seem delusive to take a more radical stance, given the
economic stakes and the potential benefits. As Robin-
son puts it, under these conditions, the situation is less
than ideal for the adoption of a strong version of the
precautionary principle ([24], p. 12).
Moreover, in view of the considerable uncertainties
associated with first generation nanotechnologies that
are already on the market, both liability and moral
responsibility attribution issues will arise in case of
damage. Such issues will be difficult to solve consid-
ering the organised irresponsibility, which character-
izes our late-modern risk society ([2]; [33], p. 18).
Nanoethics (2012) 6:29–37 35The Threat of ‘Nano-divide’
We have seen that equity issues were at stake with the
development of nanomedicine and with human en-
hancement. However, equity and distributive justice
issues emerge with generation 1. More specifically, the
much talked about threat of nano-divide, which would
increasethedividebetweenNorthandSouth,isatstake.
Nanotechnologies capable of improving quality of life
as well as nanotechnologies considered purely as a
factor of economic growth are at issue ([12], p. 29).
Indeed, several potential applications of nanotech-
nology could particularly benefit the developing
countries ([1], p. 190–191). Water purification or solar
energy production improved with the development of
nanotechnologies are part of these applications. How-
ever, it is likely that developed countries will have
access to these technologies, whereas developing
countries who would particularly benefit from these
technologies, will not be able to afford those. As Allh-
off puts it ([1], p. 192), more generally, ‘there will be
questions about whether we can use these technolo-
gies (given toxicity and other risks), whether we have
to use these technologies (given obligation of environ-
mental stewardship), and whether we have to share
them (given obligations to international distributive
justice)’. These questions appear to be already relevant
for first generation nanotechnologies.
Moreover, in a globalised market, a possible geo-
political readjustment could result from an econo-
my based on nanotechnologies. The development of
nanotechnologies may possibly increase the eco-
nomic gap between developed and developing
countries, as nanotechnologies could replace raw
material resources that need to be mined and that
lie mainly in developing countries ([29], p. 224–
225). For example, in electronics, carbon nanotubes
could replace metal conductors that are made with
gold or silver. Nanotechnologies could thus contin-
ue a trend in making industrialized countries inde-
pendent of the resources of developing countries,
thereby increasing the divide ([29], p. 225). How-
ever, emerging countries such as Brazil, South
Africa, India or China have also launched their
own R&D program in nanotechnologies—even
though systematic patent protection and the associ-
ated licence fees make it particularly difficult for
these countries to utilize the existing knowledge
([29], p. 224).
Nanotechnology as ‘Dual-use Technology’
Nanotechnology is a good example of ‘dual-use’ tech-
nology, as it is developed both for civilian and for
military purposes, or—more broadly—as it has both
beneficial/good and harmful/bad purposes, which
includes the development of weapons ([30], p. 176).
Military secrecy makes it difficult to expand on
ethical issues associated with the development of
new military technologies. However, it is necessary
at least to mention the existence of ethical problems,
which concern all generations of nanotechnologies—it
goes from toxic nanodust to enhanced battle-
jumpsuits, autonomous weapons or biological weap-
ons resulting from synthetic biology. Some kinds of
applications appear to be beneficial only, such as
nano-sized sensors that could help to detect chemical
and biological weapons for example, whereas other
applications could also contribute to create new threats
that are precisely difficult to detect ([9], p. 228).
In fact, to some extent, the use of first generation nano-
technologies in the field of military applications—toxic
nanodust for example—reiterates ethical issues already at
stake with the development of nuclear and biochemical
weapons such as the control and proliferation issues.
Moreover, the problems arising with the development
of first generation nanotechnologies will only increase
withlatergenerations.Forexample,withhumanenhance-
ment at the horizon, there will also be threats to the
identity and the integrity of the soldier as a human being.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that fundamental ethical issues
are at stake at each stage of nanotechnological devel-
opment. Indeed, besides the particular ethical issues
associated with generations 2, 3 and 4, crucial ethical
questions arise already with the development of first
generation nanotechnologies. These ethical issues are
mainly associated with the social desirability of first
generation nanotechnologies, with the difficulties to
define nanotechnologies properly, with the consequen-
ces of the important uncertainties surrounding nano-
technologies, with the threat of ‘nano-divide’, and
with nanotechnology as ‘dual-use technology’.
In fact, the cutting of the development of nano-
technologies into generations has an insidious effect:
the ethical issues that are emphasized are inevitably
36 Nanoethics (2012) 6:29–37the ones associated with generations 2, 3, and 4 be-
cause these involve possibly direct intervention on the
human being. Our attention is thereby diverted from
ethical issues linked to first generation nanotechnolo-
gies, which are however currently being widely devel-
oped without proper ethical framing. The existence of
issues associated with generations 2, 3 and 4 does not
have to serve as a pretext to evacuate the ethical
questioning related to generation 1.
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